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ABSTRACT 
TWO ESSAYS ON THE EFFECT OF MACROECONOMIC NEWS ON THE STOCK 
MARKET 
Ajay Kongera 
Old Dominion University, 2011 
Director: Dr. Licheng Sun 
This dissertation uses macroeconomic variables. In the first essay I use 
macroeconomic variables to determine if these variables affect the market's returns and 
volatilities, and in the second essay I examine whether the 11-month returns can be 
explained by these variables. 
Using macroeconomic variables and forecasts of these variables on a quarterly 
basis from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, I first develop macroeconomic surprise 
variables. The macroeconomic surprise variables are then modified by dispersion of 
forecasts to adjust for surprises from uncertainty. Dispersion adjusted forecast surprises 
have not been used extensively in the literature. I also use a monetary shock variable. The 
market index I look at is the S&P 500. Among the results obtained from OLS regressions 
are that S&P 500 returns are influenced by inflation surprises and S&P 500 volatilities 
are influenced by industrial production surprises. Based on extant theory, 
macroeconomic variables are supposed to influence asset prices. This paper contributes to 
identifying variables that previously were not seen as responsible for affecting asset 
markets. 
Macroeconomic variables are also used to study the 11-month returns in the other 
January effect. The other January effect was folklore up until Cooper, McConnell, 
Ovtchinnikov (2006) confirmed it with statistical evidence. There has been a lot of 
controversy about the other January effect. Essentially, if the return in January of a 
particular year is positive (negative) the next 11-month return will be positive (negative). 
I show that a simple macroeconomic variable such as term premium which is the 
difference of long term interest rate and short term interest rate can be equally effective 
as a predictor for the next 11-months of returns. In addition to replicating the original 
study on a different time period, I show that the other January effect is not as predictive 
as expected, the results show that the other January effect is driven by negative Januarys 
and that positive Januarys do not predict returns. In addition conditioning, the January 
returns on various macroeconomic variables shows that the January effect works for the 
market value weighted index and not the market equal weighted index. 
Members of Dissertation Committee: Dr. Larry Filer 
Dr. Kenneth Yung 
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I dedicate this dissertation to my mother and father for supporting me in all my 
endeavors, for being an inspiration to me, and for instilling in me the value of education. 
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TWO ESSAYS ON THE EFFECT OF MACROECONOMIC NEWS ON THE STOCK 
MARKET 
INTRODUCTION 
A stock market index is used in many studies to determine how the markets react 
to various risk factors, and these risks are usually determined by the effect news has on 
asset markets. Many studies have failed to determine conclusively how macroeconomic 
news affects markets. Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) say "A rather embarrassing gap exists 
between the theoretically elusive importance of systematic 'state variables' and my 
complete ignorance of their identity. The co-movements of asset prices suggest the 
presence of underlying exogenous influences, but we have not yet determined which 
economic variables, if any, are responsible." On the other hand Cooper, McConnell and 
Ovtchinnikov (2006), determine that "the return from the month of January is a powerful 
predictor of the returns over the remaining months of the year." This result seems to show 
that something other than macroeconomic news could predict stock markets into the 
future. 
There has been a large body of research which looks into how macroeconomic 
variables affect stock market returns; however, the results obtained so far have not been 
consistent. One of the earliest papers that tried to determine a relationship between 
macroeconomic news and stock returns was McQueen and Roley (1993); they found that 
news effects were determined by states of the economy. Following Andersen and 
Bollerslev (1997), a number of papers have tried to relate high frequency conditional 
volatility with macroeconomic news using their GARCH model. Only a couple of papers 
2 
Arnold and Vrugt (2008,2010) have looked at macroeconomic news and market 
volatilities using low frequency data. This paper extends their research which looked at 
how market volatility is affected by fundamental uncertainty at low frequencies, by 
incorporating macroeconomic surprises. 
In general, studies that focus on the effects of surprises from macroeconomic 




where, 8^ denotes the surprise or forecast error in macroeconomic variable m at time t, 
A^ is the actual realized value of the macroeconomic announcement, and F^ the median 
or mean value of a professional forecast survey. While this approach is simple and 
intuitive, it ignores the uncertainty associated with the forecasts. 
Some researchers, for example Wongswan (2006) standardized surprises by 
dividing it by the standard deviation of analyst forecasts. To date, however, extant 
literature focuses almost exclusively on the impact from the mean forecasting errors or 
shocks on financial markets, but I posit the results would be more powerful if I accounted 
for forecasters' uncertainty in my calculations. For example, would a 10% surprise with 
75% uncertainty be as powerful as a 5% surprise with 10% uncertainty? It is easy to see 
that the 5% surprise would have a more powerful effect on the markets than the 10% 
surprise. Therefore, when uncertainty is small you would expect a large reaction to 
surprise in the market. 
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In addition to looking at macroeconomic forecast errors, a monetary shock 
variable is used to determine its effects, if any, on the stock market. I follow Romer and 
Romer (2004) series of shock variables using a narrative approach, I convert it to a 
monthly series. Using both the macroeconomic forecast errors and monetary shock 
variables, I run regressions to determine if these variables have any effect at all on the 
S&P 500 returns and volatilities. 
Arnold and Vrugt (2008, 2010) in their studies use macroeconomic uncertainty as 
determined by dispersion of forecasters' forecasts. They look at the effect of 
macroeconomic uncertainty on market volatility and find that forecasters' uncertainty 
does account for market volatility to a certain extent. As far as the stock market is 
concerned, they find that the effect disappears after 1997. 
The main findings are that inflation surprise as given by the GDP deflator is 
significant when index returns are the dependent variable and industrial production 
surprise is significant when index volatility is the dependent variable, these results are 
stronger in the contemporaneous regressions. Monetary shocks do not seem to have any 
effect on either index returns or volatilities. 
In the next essay, I look at the Other January Effect (hereafter OJE) as studied by 
Cooper, McConnell, and Ovtchinnikov (2006) (hereafter CMO). CMO document an 
interesting new seasonality in U.S. stock returns. The 11-month holding period returns 
from February to December, conditional on positive January returns are significantly 
higher than those, conditional on negative January returns. CMO call it the Other January 
Effect (OJE) to distinguish it from the well-known January Effect that documents strong 
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positive returns in small-cap firms in January. For value weighted excess market returns 
over their primary 1940 to 2003 sample, they find that the spread between the average 
11-month return following positive January returns and the average 11-month return 
following negative January returns is a significant 14.7%. The spread is even more 
sizable using equal weighted market returns. CMO also report that the OJE cannot be 
explained by business cycles, investor sentiment, presidential cycles, or the Fama-French 
three-factor models. 
To determine whether the OJE is truly a new puzzle among a growing list of 
anomalies in the finance literature or simply a statistical fluke, Stivers, Sun, and Sun 
(2009) study the OJE using new international, style, and sub-period evidence. They 
hypothesize that, if the OJE is related to a pervasive and persistent behavioral bias, then 
one should expect the OJE to show up in the international equity markets and to persist 
over time. Using data from 22 countries, Stivers, Sun and Sun show that OJE is not a 
widespread phenomenon. This suggests that OJE is unlikely to be driven by ubiquitous 
psychological biases similar to the momentum phenomenon documented by Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) and the related international evidence as in Griffin, Ji, and Martin 
(2003). Stivers, Sun and Sun interpret their results as evidence that OJE is a temporary 
anomaly in the sense of Schwert (2003). 
Intriguingly, Stivers, Sun and Sun also find that the international OJE spreads and 
the OJE spreads in disaggregate U.S.-style portfolios are more related to the U.S. market 
level January return, rather than the respective country-specific or portfolio-specific 
January return. Further, although they do not formally test for the relation between some 
macroeconomic variables and the OJE, Stivers, Sun and Sun in untabulated results find 
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that, compared to other months, the January return is the only month that is reliably 
informative about both the subsequent credit spread change and the subsequent industrial 
production growth, and in a manner that is consistent with the OJE return spread. Taken 
together, the evidence from Stivers, Sun and Sun also appears consistent with the 
hypothesis that there might be an undiscovered linkage between the OJE and some well-
known macroeconomic variables. 
Some readers might argue that in CMO's original study, they report essentially no 
relation between commonly used business cycle variables and the OJE. However CMO's 
study in this respect is somewhat limited in terms of both scope and depth. For example, 
CMO summarize the relation between business cycle variables and the OJE in only one 
table. In light of the evidence from Stivers, Sun and Sun and given the importance of 
understanding the nature and sources of the OJE and its bearing on the efficient market 
hypothesis, a detailed analysis of the OJE and its relation with various macroeconomic 
variables appears overdue and warranted. 
I provide new evidence that the OJE is more closely related to macroeconomic 
variables than previously reported in the literature. Specifically, I show that similar to the 
January return dummy used by CMO, a dummy variable that captures the slope of the 
yield curve can also predict subsequent 11-month returns from February to December. 
The return spread for this yield curve dummy is comparable to the January dummy and is 
significant for value weighted market index. More interestingly, after controlling for the 
yield curve dummy, January return no longer appears to provide useful information about 
subsequent returns as the return spreads become negative. I also find that a dummy 
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variable that is defined as the intersection of both the January and the yield curve dummy 
is a more powerful predictor of the 11-month returns from February to December. 
Beyond the yield curve dummy, I further provide a comprehensive study of the 
role of macroeconomic variables in a standard predictive regression setting. Similar to 
CMO, the regressors that I choose are lagged macroeconomic variables including term 
premium, dividend yield, default premium, and detrended three-month Treasury bill 
yield. I also consider some variations by using non-detrended three-month Treasury bill 
yield. I find several interesting results. Consistent with the hypothesis that 
macroeconomic variables do have predictive power for subsequent February to December 
returns, adjusted R2 values of predictive regressions that exclude the January dummy 
range from 15% to 26%. Adding the January dummy elevates the adjusted R2 values to a 
range of 23% to 33%. This confirms that January returns contain useful and independent 
information. However, it also shows that the January dummy is neither unique nor 
dominant in terms of its predictive value. Last but not the least, I find that after 
controlling for the information in macroeconomic variables, the OJE return spreads does 
not appear to be ubiquitous to all the market indexes. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter looks 
into the relationship of macroeconomic and monetary shock variables with the S&P 500. 
Chapter three looks at how the OJE results may not be the result of January returns at all. 
And, the final chapter concludes and provides suggestions for future research. 
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MACROECONOMIC SURPRISES AND MONETARY SHOCK EFFECTS ON THE 
S&P 500 
I. DISCUSSION AND RELATED LITERATURE 
Almost all the current literature that focuses on survey forecasts of economic 
forecasts use some variation of the GARCH model. The forecasts they use most often 
rely on the Money Market Survey (MMS) forecasts that are given by professionals on a 
weekly basis. 
Using 17 macroeconomic variables, Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) find that 
Balance of Trade, Unemployment, Housing starts, and a monetary aggregate affect 
conditional volatility when using high frequency data. There have not been many studies 
that tie macroeconomic surprises to volatilities at low frequencies. The main reason for 
there being a few studies is that while forecasts are made at low frequencies, asset prices 
evolve at high frequencies. In the Flannery and Protopapadakis model, returns are mainly 
affected by measures of inflation and also by a monetary aggregate. 
Kim, Mckenzie and Faff (2004) look at how various macroeconomic 
announcement shocks affect the stock, bond and treasury markets using a GARCH 
model; for stocks they found that consumer and producer price inflation affects 
conditional returns and volatility. Brenner, Pasquariello, and Subrahmanyam (2009) look 
at daily conditional returns, volatility and co-movements of three financial markets: 
stock, corporate bonds and treasury bonds. They show that returns react asymmetrically 
to the information content of surprise announcements. In addition unemployment and 
retail sales news was also found to heighten stock market volatility. Schemling and 
8 
Schrimpf (2011) show that survey based inflation expectations are able to forecast future 
stock returns in many international equity markets, but they only consider inflation 
expectations as their independent variable. 
Looking into market volatility, Arnold and Vrugt (2008) show that US stock 
market volatility is significantly related to the dispersion in economic forecasts of SPF 
participants. These authors try to follow Schwert (1989), who looks into the relationship 
between market volatility and macroeconomic volatility. Engel and Rangel (2008) 
discuss volatility in a GARCH framework showing that breaking up return volatilities 
into low frequency and high frequency components would help model forecasts of 
volatility dependent on macroeconomic surprises which are generally low frequency. The 
paper shows that levels of GDP and interest rates and the volatility of inflation are 
primary causes of low frequency market volatility. Engle, Ghysels and Sohn (2009) using 
Garch-MIDAS find that return volatility at the daily level is affected by inflation and 
industrial production growth. They find that greater inflation leads to higher stock market 
volatility and greater industrial production leads to lower volatility, but they do not test 
any other variables. Adrian and Rosenberg (2008) show that the Long-Run component of 
market risk is highly correlated with industrial production growth innovations. 
The importance of dispersion is highlighted by Lahiri and Sheng (2010) who 
show that "forecast uncertainty equals disagreement plus the variance of future aggregate 
shocks that accumulate over the horizon." They use Survey of Professional Forecasters 
data for output growth and inflation to come to their conclusion. These results are 
stronger in stable periods of the market than in volatile periods and also at short horizons. 
Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens (2009) find that uncertainty, measured by beta weighted 
variance of forecasts of mean market returns by professional forecasters is able to predict 
returns better than volatility based risk measures. In evaluating forecast data from sources 
like Survey of Professional Forecasters, Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2007) examine different 
models of forecasting U.S. inflation and their main conclusion is that surveys outperform 
other forecasting methods. Stark (2010) looks at the accuracy of SPF forecasts and finds 
that the "surveys' accuracy falls sharply at quarterly horizons beyond the first," which is 
why I use only forecasts over the quarterly horizon. 
Finally, the reason I find it interesting to use a monetary shock variable along 
with macroeconomic surprises is because Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) show that an 
unanticipated 25 basis point cut in Federal funds rate target is associated with an 
approximate 1% increase in broad stock indexes. They looked at the fed futures contract 
to determine unanticipated changes in Federal funds target rate. Also, Chen (2007) shows 
that S&P 500 index returns is affected by monetary policy to a larger extent during bear 
markets and that tightening monetary policy tends to shift the markets into a bear market 
regime. Chen uses Markov-switching models to test the asymmetric effects. In addition to 
the above two authors, Bjornland and Leitemo (2009) show that real stock prices fall by 
seven to nine percent due to a monetary policy shock in a VAR model. 
The aim of the next sub-chapter of the thesis is to make progress in finding the 
elusive link between macroeconomic and monetary surprises with asset returns and 
volatilities that are alluded to theoretically, but have been elusive in empirical studies as 
stated by Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986). I specify various models and run regressions to 
find if the independent variables influence the dependent variable. 
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II. DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
A. Macroeconomic Variables and the SPF data 
I obtain the Survey of Professional Forecasters (hereafter SPF) data from Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. According to the bank's website, the SPF is the oldest 
quarterly survey of macroeconomic forecasts in the United States. It began in 1968 and 
was conducted by the American Statistical Association and the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took over the survey in 
1990. The SPF data set has been used successfully in both the economics and finance 
literature. 
The SPF forecast data is available in quarterly format. The sample I use is from 
the fourth quarter of 1968 to the fourth quarter of 2009, with a total of 165 quarterly 
observations for each variable. Although the data covers a wide variety of economic and 
financial variables, many of the variables do not have complete historical data over the 
whole sample period. Therefore, I focus on six macroeconomic variables of interest: 
nominal GDP, unemployment rate, corporate profits, industrial production, GDP price 
index (GDP deflator), and housing starts. Note that the measurement of corporate profits 
has changed in the SPF. Prior to 2006, it is measured as nominal corporate profits after 
tax excluding inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) and capital consumption adjustment 
(CCAdj). Beginning with the survey of 2006:Q1, however, this variable includes IVA 
and CCAdj. SPF projections are available for both levels and growth rates. I focus 
exclusively on the growth rates of these variables the only exception being 
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unemployment rate. According to SPF documentation, annualized growth rates are 
calculated as follows: 
* = 100fe)*-1l (2) 
where, g denotes the annualized growth rate and x denotes the level of the 
macroeconomic variable of interest. It should be noted that SPF usually contains 
forecasts for the prior quarter, the current quarter, as well as up to four quarters after the 
current quarter. The current quarter is ended as the quarter in which the survey is 
conducted. The survey usually comes out late in the second to third week of the middle 
month of each quarter. I focus only on the current quarter's forecast in this paper. 
To measure forecasting errors, I match the SPF projections against the actual 
realized values of macroeconomic variables obtained from St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Bank. I construct annualized growth rates of these variables in the same manner as in 
SPF. I then take the difference between the actual values and the mean forecast values as 
my measure of forecasting errors. 
Consistent with previous findings in the literature, I find that SPF provides 
reasonably good projections. Among the six macroeconomic variables of interest, the 
mean forecasting errors (standard deviations) are: GDP growth (gdp) 0.6663% 
(2.6676%o), unemployment rate (unemp) -0.0283% (0.1542%), industrial production (ip) -
0.00285% (3.7910%), housing starts (housing) 7.049% (25.468%), corporate profits (cp) 
5.0903% (25.02%), and GDP price index (pgdp) 0.0791% (1.1317). Hence, except for 
12 
housing starts and corporate profits, SPF projections appear almost flawless in terms of 
its accuracy. Time series plots of these forecasting errors are shown in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
B. Measuring Forecast Uncertainty 
A unique feature of the SPF data is that not only does it provide the average 
forecasts, but it also reports a measure of uncertainty of these forecasts. This uncertainty 
measure is defined by the cross-sectional forecasting dispersion. More specifically 
dispersion is the difference between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile of the SPF 
projections. Given the cross-sectional forecasting dispersion, I proceed to calculate the 
adjusted forecasting error as follows: 
8Y1 
1 disp? + £™ W 
where, d™ is the uncertainty adjusted measure of forecasting error of a macroeconomic 
variable m at time t. 8™ is the unadjusted forecasting error defined as the difference 
between the SPF projection and the actual value of the macroeconomic variable m. 
disp™ denotes the cross-sectional forecasting dispersion. s™is set to zero whenever 
disp™ =£ 0, and e™ is set to a small quantity when disp™ = 0. Among the six 
macroeconomic variables, the dispersion measures for GDP growth, corporate profits, 
and housing starts never have a zero value. Therefore e™ = 0 in these three cases. For the 
other three macroeconomic variables that do have observations of zero dispersion, I set 
e™ = 0.01 for unemployment rate, and 0.1 for both industrial production and GDP price 
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index. Note that the mean of dispersion of the three variables are 0.1557 (unemployment 
rate), 3.3715 (industrial production), and 1.0990 (GDP price index) respectively. Time 
series plots for forecast uncertainty or dispersion are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3 has 
the time series plots for uncertainty adjusted forecasting errors of macroeconomic 
variables. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
C. Romer Monetary Shocks 
For the monetary shock variable I use the variables provided by Crowe and 
Barakchian (2010), they follow the narrative approach derived in Romer and Romer 
(2004). Essentially, Romer and Romer look at the quantitative and narrative records that 
are available for the decisions that the Federal Reserve makes regarding federal funds 
rate. These records around FOMC meetings are then quantified and regressed against the 
Federal Reserve's internal forecasts. In other words, the change in intended funds rate 
around FOMC meetings are regressed against intended funds rate against level of 
intended funds before changes associated with the meetings, inflation, real output growth 
and unemployment rate, the residuals is the unanticipated monetary shock variable, this 
variable is then converted to a monthly time series depending on the month in which the 
FOMC meeting occurred, if two meetings occurred in a particular month the shocks are 
summed and if no meeting occurred the shock was 0 for that particular month. This 
variable is available from March of 1969 to June of 2008. The time series plot of 
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monetary shock variable is provided in Figure 4. This data set has a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 0.2952. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
D. S&P Returns and Volatilities 
S&P 500 daily price data is acquired from Yahoo Finance database, the prices are 
adjusted for dividends and splits, this data is then converted to daily returns, daily returns 
are then converted to monthly and quarterly returns in addition to deriving monthly and 
quarterly volatilities. The volatility is the standard deviation in the return data for a month 
or a quarter. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the data. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Regression Results with Adjustment for Uncertainty in Macroeconomic news 
To see if any of my macroeconomic surprises that have been adjusted for 
uncertainty have an effect on S&P 500 returns during the current quarter, I run following 
regressions, the adjusted macroeconomic surprises are contemporaneous in the first 
regression and the adjusted macroeconomic surprises are lagged in the second regression. 
Table 2, Panel A reports the results of the following two regressions: 
Rt= fe + fedf
v + P2dt
nemP + fed? + Mht°USin9 + M? (4) 
+ MP9dP + et 
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Rt = fe + fed^l + /? 2Cr
P + Mti + feCT9 + fed?-, (5) 
+ fi6d
vt°? + * 
Rt, is the S&P 500 return for each quarter t. As shown in equation (3), d™ is the 
dispersion adjusted forecasting error for the macroeconomic variable m at time t. The 
cross-sectional forecasting dispersion is measured as the difference between the 75th and 
the 25th percentile of the SPF projections. My interpretation of adjusted forecasting error 
is in essence a "weighted" measure of forecasting errors. For example, a large 
macroeconomic forecast enor with a large degree of uncertainty and therefore the 
macroeconomic forecast error has a smaller impact than a large macroeconomic forecast 
enor with a small degree of uncertainty. I argue that by using uncertainty-adjusted 
forecasting errors, we can better depict how investors react to macroeconomic news. 
The results in Table 2, Panel A show that both the contemporaneous and lagged 
relationships have very small R values (7% for the contemporaneous regression and 2% 
for the lagged regression), with the gross domestic product price deflator (pgdp) having a 
negative explanatory power at the 5% level for the contemporaneous regression and 1% 
level for the lagged relationship. This seems to be in line with various previous studies 
(Flannery and Protopapadakis, 2002) that mainly look at inflation using both consumer 
price index and producer price index. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The next set of regressions look at these same adjusted macroeconomic forecast 
enors, but the dependent variable here is the quarterly volatility Volt of the S&P 500. 
The results for the following equations are shown in Table 2, Panel B. 
16 
iddp , p junemp , p dp , Q ^housing , Q ,cp Volt = /?0 + ptdt + fed?" + fed? + & C + fed? (6) 
lpt
adp + st + f36d
P9dP  et 
Volt = /?0 + ftdf* + fed^l
mp + fed?, + MIT"9 (7) 
+ Psd?-i + fed
P9-? + ^ 
The R2 values are better in these equations than in the level equations with R2 for 
the contemporaneous relationships being 16% and the R for the lagged relationship 
being 5%. At the 1% level both equations (6) and (7) show industrial production (ip) to 
be significant. In the Garch-MIDAS model where the authors Engle, Ghysels and Sohn 
(2009) try to see how low frequency macroeconomic variables affect daily returns and 
conditional volatilities, they find that both inflation and industrial production affect 
conditional volatilities, this study however does not test other macroeconomic variables 
and each macro variable's effect on the market is tested separately and not conjointly. 
B. Testing raw forecasts 
In this section I test whether the SPF forecasts have any effect on S&P 500 
returns or volatilities. Instead of using quarterly returns and volatilities, I use monthly 
returns and volatilities. The forecasters usually provide their quarterly forecasts late in the 
second to third week of the middle month of each quarter. The forecast variable / t
m 
represents the mean of the SPF forecasts of a particular quarter, with m representing one 
of the macro-variables and t representing the quarter. I run the following regressions with 
the results reported in Table 3. 
?gdp . p runemp , p rip , p chousing 
Rt,so-day = fe+fetr + feft
 p + fefr + feft y (8) 
-day + feft + feft + Rt-l,30-day + £t 
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Volt,3Q_day = /?0 + fefl? + fef?™
mv + fefilx + feftT
iU9 (9) 
+ feftZ + feftPAdP + Volt-li30-day + et 
where, Rt,3o-day a nd Volt3Q^day are the S&P 500 returns and volatilities for the middle 
month of each quarter respectively, Rt-i,3o-day a nd V°h-t,3o-day a r e m e S&P 500 
returns and volatilities for the first month of each quarter. A lagged dependent variable is 
used to subsume any autocorrelation that may be present in the dependent variable. The 
R2 is 8% for the return regression and 55% for the volatility regression, however, in the 
volatility regression only nominal GDP and the GDP price index seem to have any 
explanatory power at the 10% significance level, most of the explanatory power comes 
from the regression constant and the lagged dependent variable. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
C. Relationship between S&P 500 and Volatilities of Macroeconomic forecast 
enor 
Here, I follow Arnold and Vrugt (2008) to calculate the volatilities of dispersion 
adjusted macroeconomic forecast enor variables. I use an AR (1) - model to collect the 
residuals of the dispersion adjusted macroeconomic forecast enors d™ and call it £™, the 
absolute value of this |£™| is taken as the volatility v™. v™ is used in regression the 
results of which appear in Panel A of Table 4. In Panel B, I use a variation of v™, where 
nm _ yt m 
°t — Li=t-3vi • 
Rt= fe+ fevfP + fev?nemp + p3v? + p,v
h
t
ousin9 + psv? (10) 
+ p6vr
dp + feRt-i + et 
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Volt = fo + ^vf
v + fl2v™
emp + fev? + fevht
ousin9 + p5v? (11) 
+ P6v*
9dp+p7Volt.1+et 
Rt=fe+ feofP + fe*rmP + fe°? + fe4°USin9 + fe°? (12) 
+ p6a
P9dp + p7Rt_t + et 
Vol, = fe+ fec?dv + fearemP + fe°? + fee?0™719 + fe°? (13) 
+ p6a
P9dp + p7Volt-x + Et 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The result for equation 10 seems to be the strongest, and shows that S&P 500 may 
be influenced by volatilities of forecast enors in nominal GDP and GDP price index at 
the 5% level of significance and by industrial production at the 1% level of significance, 
the R2 for this equation is 10%. Industrial production also appears to be statistically 
significant in equation (11), which has S&P 500 volatility as the dependent variable. 
Autoconelation in the equations presented above is controlled using a lag of the 
dependent variable which is significant in the index volatility equations, these results are 
in Table 4. Arnold and Vrugt (2008) run the volatility equations but with dispersion being 
used as an independent variable along with volatility calculated with the AR(1) - model 
on the actual macroeconomic variables, they also break up the regression into two sub-
periods, one covering 1969 to 1996 and the other from 1997 to 2004. In their results they 
find that uncertainty from dispersion of analysts' forecasts in the 1969 to 1996 period is 
significant for nominal GDP and corporate profits when they do not sum up the previous 
quarters volatilities. After summing the macroeconomic volatilities for four quarters they 
find the regression is significant for nominal GDP and unemployment but in the period 
1997 to 2004 they find no significant relationships. My results for equations (12) and (13) 
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are not as strong as those for equations (10) and (11), for S&P 500 returns GDP price 
index is significant at the 5% level and for S&P 500 volatility Industrial production is 
significant at the 10% level. 
D. S&P 500 index and Monetary Shocks 
Here I look at whether monthly monetary shock variable (Monetaryt) is able to 
determine S&P 500 returns and volatilities in contemporaneous regressions given by the 
following equations. The monetary shock variable is got from data provided by Crowe 
and Barakchian (2010), Crowe and Barakchaian follow the Romer and Romer (2004) 
paper to derive monetary shock using the narrative approach. The results are presented in 
Table 5. 
Rt= fe+ feMonetaryt + p2Rt_x + et
 K } 
Volt = fe+ pxMonetaryt + feVolt^ + et ^ ' 
Rt and Volt here, are the monthly returns and volatilities of the S&P 500. Surprisingly, 
for the full sample period monetary shocks do not seem to have any effect on S&P 500 
index returns or volatilities. As before, in the volatility equation the lagged dependent 
variable is highly significant showing that volatility is auto-conelated. Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005) regress CRSP value weighted returns on expected and unexpected 
components of monthly fed funds rate changes and they find a statistically significant 
negative response to unanticipated rate increases and little or no response to the 
anticipated actions, their sample time period was from May 1989 to December 2002, the 
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adjusted R2 for their regression is 7%. I also do sub-period analysis to correspond with 
Bernanke and Kuttner's paper. My results don't change much from the full sample 
regression. Panel A of Table 5 has the full sample period regression, Panel B is pre 1989 
and Panel C is post 1989. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
A. Regression Results with Adjustment for Uncertainty in Macroeconomic news 
and Monetary Shocks 
In my final set of regression equations, I add the monetary shock variable. The 
monetary shock variable is the monthly monetary shock variable provided by Crowe and 
Barakchian (2010) which is summed over 3 months to make it a quarterly variable, this 
quarterly monetary shock variable is added to equations (4), (5), (6) and (7) resulting in 
the following equations, whose results are presented in Table 6. 
Rt = fe + fed9dp + p2d™
emp + p3d? + M
ht°USin9 + fed? (16) 
+ p6d
pgdp + pxMonetaryt + et 
Rt= fe+ fed9t
dl + fedTTP + fedtr + fedhtT
n9 + fed?, (17) 
+ ped
P9dp + pxMonetaryt_x + et 
Volt = p0 + pxd
9dp + pXnemp + p3d? + p,d
h
t
ousin9 + p5d? (18) 
+ p6d
P9dp + p,Monetaryt + st 
Vol, = fe + ptd?
dp + p2d™i
mp + fed?, + P^°fn9 (19) 
+ p5d?_t + p6d
P9dp + pxMonetaryt_r + e. 
As expected, the results do not change substantially with the addition of the monetary 
shock variable; GDP price index remains significant in both the contemporaneous and 
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lagged relations. When the dependent variable is S&P 500 index returns, however, 
industrial production also becomes significant at the 10% level in the contemporaneous 
equation. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
When S&P 500 index volatility is the dependent variable industrial production is 
significant in both the contemporaneous and lagged relations at the 1% level, R increases 
to 25%) in the contemporaneous relation while R is 3% in the lagged relationship. 
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MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES AND THE OTHER JANUARY EFFECT 
I. BACKGROUND DISCUSSION AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
Calendar effects in financial markets are often viewed as a refutation of market 
efficiency. Some of the well-known examples include: the January effect (Keim, 1983 
and Reinganum, 1983), the weekend effect (French, 1980), the sell-in-May effect 
(Bouman and Jacobsen, 2002), and the turn-of-the-month effect (Ariel, 1987). These and 
other seasonal effects, if unexplained, pose a serious challenge to the efficient market 
hypothesis since it is difficult to understand why arbitrage forces cannot correct such 
blatant violations of market efficiency. 
The other January Effect (OJE) is a recent addition to this growing list of calendar 
related anomalies. It is also known as the January barometer among Wall Street 
practitioners, who primarily focus on using raw January returns as a predictor for stock 
market's performance for the remainder of the year. 
Cooper, McConnell, Ovtchinnikov (2006) (CMO) notes that this effect was first 
documented in Yale Hirsch's Stock Trader's Almanac in the early 1970s. However 
among academicians, it had received little attention until CMO, who provide the first 
rigorous econometric test of the effect using both excess and raw returns. 
CMO show that the return spread for the 11-month following positive and 
negative Januaries are highly significant. In addition, CMO find no evidence that the OJE 
can be explained by business cycle variables, the Presidential Cycle in stock returns, or 
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investor sentiment. Thus, although CMO document strong statistical results, they are 
agnostic about its potential explanations. 
Most of the evidence from international tests of the OJE refutes its presence, for 
example Bohl and Salm (2007) show that the OJE was only present in 3 out of 14 
countries they examined and that the effect does not appear to exist after 1980. Easton 
and Pinder (2007) replicate the CMO study over 44 countries and found limited evidence 
for this effect in 5 of those countries at the 5% level of significance. Marshall and 
Vishaltanachoti (2008) find that OJE cannot be seen in 22 equity markets of the 23 which 
they studied and conclude that it only works superficially in the U.S. markets. The 
persistence of the January dummy variable is of concern to Marshall and Vishaltanachoti 
(2008) brought their attention from a paper by Powell, Shi, Smith and Whaley (2007). 
Marshall and Vishaltanachoti (2010) show that the OJE does not outperform a passive 
12-month buy and hold strategy. However, Brown and Luo (2006) after determining that 
the OJE is more useful only when January is a down month, proceed to extend the OJE to 
12 months following January and find these results stronger than 11-month results for the 
OJE. 
Stivers, Sun and Sun (2009) confront the issue by examining the international, 
style, and sub-period evidence. They hypothesize that the OJE could be driven by three 
primary potential explanations. First, the OJE might be attributable to an internationally 
priced risk factor. If so, one would expect that the OJE would also exist in international 
markets and that the OJE should persist over time. Second, if the OJE is related to a 
pervasive and persistent behavioral bias, then one should also expect the OJE to show up 
in the international equity markets and to persist over time. Third, the OJE could be a 
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temporary anomaly in the sense of Schwert (2003). In this case an anomaly might simply 
be a statistical abenation with no underlying economic explanation or alternatively be 
tied to a specific period of history, as the realized returns were responding to the 
economic and trading environment at the time. Presumably, the anomalous price behavior 
is unlikely to persist under this scenario. Stivers, Sun and Sun find little evidence that the 
OJE is pervasive in international markets. Stivers, Sun and Sun also find that OJE has 
weakened somewhat in recent sub-period samples, especially for equal weighted index 
raw returns. Taken together, they conjecture that the OJE is likely to be a "temporary 
anomaly". 
It is noteworthy that Stivers, Sun and Sun (2009) also document an interesting 
OJE spillover effect from the U.S. to other countries. In their Table 4, they find that for 
eight major markets (Australia,Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the 
U.K.) the own-country OJE effect is essentially non-existent, with an average return 
spread of only 0.72%. In contrast, conditional on the sign of U.S. market January returns, 
the average return spread is 10.83%. Thus Stivers, Sun and Sun conclude that the OJE 
phenomenon in these eight major countries is more related to the U.S. January return, 
rather than the own country's January return. Similar results (Tables 5 and 7) are also 
evident in U.S. industry, book-to-market, and size-based portfolios. It is shown that OJE 
spreads are stronger when conditioning upon the market-level January return than when 
conditioning upon the respective own-portfolio January return. 
Hence, the OJE appears to be mainly a U.S. market-oriented phenomenon. But 
what drives this result? One possibility is that market performance in January could be 
influenced by portfolio decisions made by long-term investors who rebalance their 
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portfolios after a careful review of the state of the U.S. economy. Thus, for example, if 
these "smart money" investors decide that the economic outlook is bearish and determine 
to reduce their exposure to the stock market for the coming year, then the exodus of these 
investors on the margin is likely to result in a negative January return, and vice versa. 
Given its importance and size, the performance of U.S. market should in turn exert a big 
impact on global markets as well as industry, book-to- market, and size-based portfolios. 
If this transmission mechanism holds true and "smart money" investors act on available 
economic information, then one way to test this hypothesis is to see if lagged 
macroeconomic variables have predictive power for returns in the post-January months. 
In addition, it is interesting to see if after controlling for the lagged macroeconomic 
variables, the OJE is still prominent. I present empirical results addressing these issues in 
the following section. 
Following CMO, I mainly focus on the OJE using U.S. market data. Specifically, 
I use monthly value weighted and equal weighted index returns from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I define a January dummy variable that is equal to 1 
if the January CRSP return is positive and 0 otherwise. Conditional on the January 
dummy, I calculate the following 11-month holding period return from February to 
December. The difference in the average 11 - month returns following positive and 
negative Januaries is called the return spread. I repeat the calculations using both raw 
returns and excess returns; excess returns are obtained by subtracting the 1-month risk-
free rate from raw returns. 
I collect macroeconomic variables from Federal Reserve Bank at St. Louis and 
CRSP, focusing on the following commonly used variables: term premium defined as the 
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difference between the yields on the 10-year and 1-year Treasury notes, dividend yield 
constructed from value weighted CRSP index as in Fama and French (1988), default 
premium is calculated as the difference between yields on Moody's BAA and AAA rated 
corporate bonds, and for short-term interest rate, I use the 3-month Treasury bill rate. My 
sample period is from 1954 to 2009, this period was selected based on the availability of 
macroeconomic data. 
II. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, I present my main empirical results. First I investigate if a dummy 
variable that represents the shape of the yield curve has similar predictive power for the 
11-month returns from February to December, and if so what is its relation to the January 
dummy variable. Second, I report predictive regression results using standard 
macroeconomic variables as regressors. I compare the predictive power of these 
macroeconomic variables to that of the January dummy variable. Finally, I test if 
information contained in January returns, which are orthogonal to macroeconomic 
variables, still carry predictive power for the subsequent 11-month returns. 
A. Return Spreads from the Slope of Yield Curve 
From the perspective of an investor who relies on the OJE to make portfolio 
decisions, a trading strategy suggested by CMO is to go long stocks if January market 
return is positive and switch to T-bills otherwise. Such a strategy has the advantage of 
being simple to identify in real time and easy to implement. Likewise, my goal here is to 
see if I can come up with a macroeconomic variable to generate real time trading signals 
that are easy to follow without any ambiguity. Among the commonly used 
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macroeconomic variables, the term premium appears to be a good choice. Note that the 
sign of term premium indicates the slope of the yield curve. Namely when the term 
premium is positive, the slope of the yield curve is positive and vice versa. The reason 
for choosing this variable is twofold. First, the slope of the yield curve is a well-known 
predictor of business cycles (Wheelock and Wohar, 2009). In particular, downward 
sloping yield curves are quite successful in predicting future recessions. Second, this 
yield curve variable is simple to construct and can be easily adopted for real time 
investment decisions. Later, I show that yield curve is not the optimal variable in terms of 
its predictive power for the following 11 -month returns from February to December. 
Similar to the January dummy variable in the OJE, I construct a dummy variable based 
on the sign of the yield curve, which is equal to 1 if the term premium in December of the 
prior year is positive and 0 otherwise. 
The standard methodology in the literature is to estimate a simple regression 
model using the dummy variable of interest as the regressor. I estimate the following five 
regression models: 
r t = o c +pD}
an+ E, (20) 
r, = oc + PD{P + £t (21) 
r, = oc + pD]t
an-TP + E, (22) 
r, = oc + pDTt
p-]an + st (23) 
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r t = o c +pD
T
t
Px]an+ e, (24) 
where rt is the 11-month holding period return from February to December in year t, 
D, a January dummy. Djp is the yield curve dummy variable. To see if the OJE is still 
significant after controlling for the slope of the yield curve, I define a new dummy 
variable Dt
an~ that equals one if Z)/an = 1 and Djp= 0, and equals zero otherwise. For 
comparison, I also include a dummy variable Dt
 n that equals one if Djp = 1 and 
Dt
an = 0. Finally, Dt is a dummy variable that equals one if Z)/
an= 1 and Djp = 1, 
and equals zero otherwise. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The results are reported in Table 7. Consistent with CMO, Panel A shows that 
the OJE appears to be quite strong in my sample period from 1954 to 2009. For instance, 
the return spreads for value weighted and equal-weight index excess returns are 12.54% 
and 14.76% respectively. The results based on raw returns are similar albeit slightly 
weaker, especially for equal weighted index. Interestingly, the results reported in Panel B 
indicate that the yield curve dummy also has predictive power for the 11-month returns 
from February to December. For example, based on the excess value weighted index, the 
average 11-month return following a positive (negative) yield curve is 8.50% (-3.24%) 
with a significant return spread of 11.73%. These results are comparable to the January 
dummy variable. Overall, the yield curve dummy variable appears to work well for the 
value weighted index, but loses statistical significance in the case of equal weighted index 
returns. 
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In panel C, I report the return spreads for the January dummy after controlling for 
the yield curve dummy. I find that when the dummy variable DJt
an~ is equal to one, 
namely when the January return is positive and the yield curve is negative, the average 
11-month return is quite small. For example, it is only -5.23% and -2.73% for value 
weighted and equal weighted index excess returns respectively. In the case when Dt
an is 
equal to zero, the average 11-month return is large and negative. For example, it is -
7.13% and -9.59% for value weighted and equal weighted index excess returns 
respectively. Therefore, the return spreads turn out to be negative, albeit not statistically 
significant. In panel D, I reverse the roles of the January and yield curve dummies. I find 
the average 11-month return is low when yield curve is positive and January return is 
negative, and high otherwise. Thus the results from panels C and D show that these two 
effects are quite interdependent. 
The results from Panel E confirms the observation that January Dummy and Term 
Premium dummy are interdependent. It shows that when both January and yield curve 
dummies are positive, the average 11-month return from February and December is 
substantially higher than the case when either one of the dummy variables is negative. 
This result show's that the return spreads become even stronger than when using either 
the January or the yield curve dummy alone. For instance, the spreads are 13.96% and 
12.96% for value weighted and equal weighted index excess returns respectively, and are 
highly significant. Taken together, the results based on the shape of the yield curve 
appear to be consistent with the notion that the OJE is at least partially related to 
macroeconomic variables. 
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B. Predictive regressions 
While the results from the yield curve dummy variable are revealing, they are 
somewhat limited due to the focus on only one macroeconomic variable. Hence I proceed 
to test the relation between a set of commonly used macroeconomic variables and the 
OJE in a predictive regression setting. The predictors include dividend yield, term 
premium, default premium, and short-term interest rate. The choices of these variables 
follow CMO as well as extensive literature on stock return predictability. It should be 
noted that CMO focus exclusively on the detrended 3-month Treasury bill rate as a proxy 
for the short-term interest rate variable. To detrend the T-bill yield, CMO divide the 
monthly T-bill yields by the average of the previous 12 monthly observations. 
Presumably CMO perform the detrending because of the high autoconelation in monthly 
T-bill yields, which might be a concern when monthly interest rates are used. However in 
the stock return predictability literature, it is very common to use non-detrended short 
rate (Bossaerts and Hillion, 1999). In the cunent context, since OJE requires only annual 
observations, it is likely to be less problematic to use non-detrended short rate. Hence I 
include both types of short rates in the following regression analysis. 
Formally, I run variations of the following regression model to determine the 
relation between OJE and lagged macroeconomic variables. 
RFEB,DEC = ^ + piTERMti + P2mVt_, + PsDEF,^ 
+ p+DYLD,-! + PsYLD,.! + aiD
J
t
AN + a2R[ 
+ St 
JAN , DJAN (25) 
where, Rt ' is the 11 -month return from February to December in year t. The 
regressors are mostly lagged macro variables term premium (TERM), dividend yield 
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(DIV), default premium (DEF ), detrended three-month T-bill yield (DYLD) and its non-
detrended counterpart (YLD). The main result here is that the regression has more 
explanatory power when YLD is used instead of DYLD and this explanatory power 
increases when the January Dummy is used. However, using the January returns instead 
of the January dummy has less explanatory power. Panel A reports the value weighted 
excess return regression results; the adjusted R2 without the January dummy but with T-
bill yield is 19.45% while it is 31.66% when the January dummy is used, these results are 
slightly less when January Macro Variables are used in the regression, this is true for 
Panels B, C, and D. The adjusted R2 without January dummy in Panel B for raw value 
•y 
weighted returns are 15.34% and with the January dummy is 22.74%. The adjusted R 
without January dummy in Panel C for raw equal weighted excess returns are 25.08% 
and with the January dummy is 33.19%. And finally for Panel D, the adjusted R without 
the January dummy 21.21% and with the January dummy is 29.09%, all these results are 
for the case where the macroeconomic regressors are for December of the previous year. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
To sum up, the results from Table 8,1 find that lagged dividend yield and non-
detrended short-term interest rate have predictive power that are comparable to the 
January dummy variable for the subsequent 11 -month returns from February to 
December. In addition, default premium appears to have predictive power for equal 
weighted index returns but not value weighted returns, presumably because small-cap 
stocks are more sensitive to default risk. Interestingly, macroeconomic variables (DIV 
and YLD) are capable of explaining a substantial amount of variation in the subsequent 
11 -month returns. Thus it appears that January dummy is neither unique nor predominant 
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in terms of its predictive power. Moreover, my results show that part of the reason that 
CMO find no explanatory power for macroeconomic variable is probably due to the fact 
that they chose detrended rather than non-detrended short term interest rate. 
C. Comparison with CMO's Results 
So far, I establish in a regression setting, macroeconomic variables do have 
predictive power for the 11-month returns from February to December. This appears at 
odds with the analysis from CMO. However, CMO do use a different methodology. In 
their approach, CMO first run a regression where lagged macroeconomic variables are 
the regressors and the 11-month post-January return is the dependent variable. They then 
calculate the 11-month predicted return using the estimated coefficients and the realized 
observations of the macroeconomic variables. Next, they sort years according to whether 
the 11-month predicted return is above or below the mean predicted return over the 
sample period and then sort years according to whether the January returns are predicted 
to be positive or negative. CMO argue that if macroeconomic variables can explain the 
OJE, then by sorting the observations according to high and low 11-month predicted 
returns, the spread between post-January excess returns following positive and negative 
Januarys should be insignificant, but they do not find this to be true. In fact, they find the 
return spreads after the sorting procedure is still highly significant. The returns they use 
for the return spread is abnormal returns which is the difference between the actual and 
predicted 11-month market returns. 
To understand the differences between CMO and my findings based on the 
regression analysis, I adopt the same sorting procedure used by CMO. There are some 
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minor differences. First, CMO's sample period is from 1940 to 2003, while mine is from 
1954 to 2009. Second, CMO only report the results based on abnormal returns (residuals 
from the predictive regression), whereas I report the results for both abnormal returns and 
the raw returns. Last but not least, CMO's predictive regression uses only the detrended 
short-term interest rate. I instead report results using both detrended and non-detrended 
short-term interest rates. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Panel A of Table 9 reports the results based on the set of predictors chosen by 
CMO. First I estimate the following regression. 
RFEB,DEC = ^ + piTERMtx + p2DiVt_x + pzDEF,-i 
(26) 
+ pADYLDt_x + E, 
where Rt ' is the 11-month post-January return, and the regressors are lagged (from 
December of the prior year) macro variables: term premium (TERM), dividend yield 
(DIV), default premium (DEF), and detrended three-month T-bill yield (DYLD). 
Following CMO, I sort the data according to E[R], the predicted 11-month returns from 
the regression. I report the mean returns (in percentage) for four scenarios where E[R] > 
median E[R] or E[R] < median E[R] and the return in January is positive or negative. I 
include results based on the abnormal returns (residuals) as well as the full holding period 
returns using CRSP value weighted excess returns (VWR - Rf ), value weighted raw 
return (VWR), equal weighted excess returns (EWR - Rf ), and equal weighted raw 
returns (EWR). The results based on abnormal returns are largely inconsistent with CMO. 
Significant differences of the means of abnormal and raw returns in positive and negative 
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Januarys are only found in cases where E[R] < median E[R], and where value weighted 
excess returns, equal weighted excess returns and equal weighted returns are regressed 
against macroeconomic variables. All these results are significant at the 5% level. 
Next I look at the following equation to see if replacing detrended yield with the 
non-detrended yield makes any difference to the results above. 
RFEB,DEC = fi + fiTERM + p2mVt_x + foDEF,-! 
(27) 
+ ptfLD,-x + E, 
Here again the results are not substantially different from the detrended case, most 
significant results are obtained where E[R] < median E[R]. In Panel B of Table 9,1 find 
statistically significant differences in abnormal means and raw means in value weighted 
excess returns, equal weighted excess returns and equal weighted returns. The results are 
consistent, except in the case where E[R] > median E[R], the abnormal mean of value 
weighted returns is significant. The statistically significant difference is driven by 
negative January returns. 
To sum up, the results are inconsistent with the results of CMO. Furthermore, 
replacing detrended T-bill yield with non-detrended T-bill yield does not change the 
results. The time period of CMO's study and the time period used in my regression may 
account for the fact that I do not observe the OJE results that were shown by CMO. It 
also appears that the OJE is driven by negative Januarys. 
D. The OJE after controlling for macroeconomic effects 
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Next I test directly if incremental information from January returns has predictive 
power for the next 11 -month returns beyond those provided by macroeconomic variables. 
My goal is to determine whether the OJE is prominent after controlling for the 
macroeconomic variables on January returns. To this end, I first regress January returns 
on lagged macroeconomic variables. Based on my regression results, I pick the following 
lagged regressors from December of the prior year: term premium (TERM ), dividend 
yield (DIV), default premium (DEF), and three-month T-bill yield (YLD). Note that I 
replace DYLD with YLD because of my earlier finding that it has more predictive 
power for the post-January returns. Thus the first model that I consider is as follows: 
R{AN = p0+ pxTERM,.x + P2DIVt_x + P3DEFt_x + p4YLDt_x 
(28) 
+ £t 
where RJ. is the CRSP index return in January of year t. The OLS residuals £t contains 
the incremental information in January returns since OLS residuals are, by construction, 
orthogonal to the regressors (in this case lagged macroeconomic variables). Thus the 
second step is to calculate the returns spreads based on the signs of £t. Following CMO, I 
classify the Januarys in my sample into positive (£t > 0) and negative (st < 0) Januarys. I 
report the mean returns for the post-January 11-month returns following positive and 
negative Januarys, as well as the return spreads and their associated p-values. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Panel A of Table 10 reports the results for this approach. Interestingly, I find that 
after controlling for lagged macroeconomic variables from December of the prior year, it 
appears that the OJE is no longer significant for equal weighted CRSP index returns. The 
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return spreads are 7.47%> and 8.20% for excess and raw returns respectively, but neither 
is statistically significant. For value weighted index returns, however, the returns spreads 
are still over 10% and statistically significant. Thus the lagged macroeconomic variable 
in December of the prior year appears to be a sufficient control for equal weighted index 
but not sufficient for value weighted index. 
I do not restrict myself to December of the prior year's variables but also use 
January of the cunent year's macroeconomic variables as the January dummy is got from 
returns in January of the cunent year. I use December of prior year's macroeconomic 
variables in my previous regressions largely to be consistent with CMO, who focus on 
this timing convention. Since the OJE uses information up to January of a given year to 
predict post-January returns in the same year, it appears reasonable to use 
macroeconomic variables up to January of the same year. At least, this would put January 
return and other macroeconomic variables on a level playing field, and would not 
introduce any "look-ahead" bias. Therefore, I proceed to run the following regression. 
RJtAN = fe + feTERMt + p2DIVt + P3DEFt + p4YLDt + E, (29) 
where, the regressors are the macroeconomic variables in January of year t. Thus the 
residuals from this regression contain information from January returns that are 
unconelated with macroeconomic variables up to January of year t. I then proceed to 
categorize the Januarys in my sample into positive and negative Januarys according to the 
signs of £t. I report the mean post-January 11-month holding period returns following 
positive and negative Januarys and their spreads in Panel B of Table 10. The result here 
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is not much different from that of the previous model (28). The spreads are 9.46% and 
10.00% for value weighted CRSP excess index returns and raw index returns 
respectively, and 7.47% and 8.20% for equal weighted CRSP excess index returns and 
raw index returns. 
Since the dividend yield is constructed by using price information, some readers 
might be concerned that the results from model (29) are driven by the fact that January 
dividend yield shares the same price information as the market return in January. To 
alleviate this concern, I rerun the regression but exclude dividend yield from the model. 
The resulting regression is below: 
RJtAN = fe + feTERMt + p3DEFt + p4YLDt_x + E, (30) 
where, the regressors are the same as in model (29) other than the exclusion of January 
dividend yield. The results are shown in Panel C of Table 10. I find that the January 
return spreads are quite similar to those reported in Panel B: 9.70% and 10.12% for value 
weighted CRSP excess index returns and raw index returns, and 13.19% and 10.34% for 
equal weighted CRSP excess index returns and raw index returns. Once again the results 
are significant for the value weighted returns but not for the equal weighted returns. 
I further examine the robustness of these results by dividing the sample into three 
sub-periods. The first sub-period is from 1954 to 1973, which is around the time when 
first public documentation of the OJE was published in Yale Hirsh's Stock Trader's 
Almanac. This could be labeled as the pre-discovery period. The other two sub-periods 
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are from 1974 to 1993 and from 1994 to 2009. Panel A in Table 11 shows the results for 
following model: 
R{AN = fe + feTERMt„x + P2DEFt_x + p3YLDt_x + pjERMt 
+ p5DEFt + p6YLDt + E, 
The main results from the above model is that for the entire sample period, the 
value weighted excess return is significant with spread of 9.92% with January returns as 
the dependent variable. When the January dummy is used the spread is 12.77%. For the 
sample period of 1974 to 1993,1 obtain a statistically significant spread of 11.39% using 
the January dummy as the dependent variable. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
Significant results are also obtained for the entire sample, using the value 
weighted return as the dependent variable with a mean spread of 10.83% and when the 
dummy variable is used as the dependent variable, the spread is 9.56%. However, 
significant results are not obtained for the sub-periods. 
For the case of equal weighted excess returns using the January dummy as the 
dependent variable, I get significant results using both the entire sample period and the 
1954 to 1973 sub-period. The mean spreads are 13.24% and 30.60%) respectively. 
And finally, when only the equal weighted return is used with the January dummy 
as the dependent variable, significant means spread is found only for 1954 to 1973 sub-
period with a mean spread of 30.49%. 
39 
Summing up, the OJE is not consistently found in all sub-periods, however, it has 
to be cautioned the number of years available for sub-period analysis is very small. 
Following my earlier result using the term premium dummy, the OJE seems to be 
predominant in CRSP value weighted excess and value weighted returns. 
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CONCLUSION 
Reviewing the results obtained from the two different studies, in the first study on 
how macroeconomic variables affect a market index, I observe that there is much room 
for future research. Looking at the effect of macroeconomic forecast enors on the S&P 
500 index I find that industrial production is an important variable in contemporaneous 
relationships and this variable in other studies is noticeable by its absence, with some 
authors justifying why they do not observe its effect in their studies. In the second study 
where I look at the other January Effect, conflicting results were obtained; the 
macroeconomic variables do not seem to entirely subsume the OJE but it appears that 
these macroeconomic variables could be used to predict future returns much like the OJE, 
I also found that the OJE does not conform to the original results of CMO when the 11-
month returns are conditioned on macroeconomic variables. 
Regressing S&P 500 index returns on SPF dispersion adjusted macroeconomic 
forecast enors, I find that the GDP deflator has some explanatory power. When looking 
at S&P 500 volatilities, I find that industrial production explains volatility along with the 
GDP deflator. When I look at forecasters' ability to forecast volatility, I do not find 
forecasters able to predict either returns or volatilities above the 5% level of significance. 
When using volatility in the surprises as the regressor, I find that the GDP deflator 
has significant explanatory power on S&P 500 returns and volatility. Volatility of 
industrial production forecast enor also show significant explanatory power on S&P 500 
returns and volatility. Volatility of nominal GDP has some explanatory power when the 
S&P 500 returns are regressed against it. 
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Monetary Shocks do not seem to have any effect on S&P 500 returns or 
volatilities. This is a surprise since previous researchers find that monetary shocks cause 
the stock market as a whole to react. Finally, I observe that my results are robust to the 
addition of the monetary shock variable to my regressions where S&P 500 returns and 
volatilities are the dependent variables and macroeconomic variables are independent 
variables. 
Though I observe a couple of macroeconomic variables using dispersion adjusted 
surprises, this thesis suggests many different future avenues for research. Among them 
the search for evidence in international markets, the attempt to reconcile low frequency 
observations of macroeconomic data with high frequency market data, and to check what 
effect dispersion adjusted macroeconomic forecast enors have on different markets. 
In the next essay, I look at how the macroeconomic variables, among them term 
premium, dividend yield, default premium and short term interest rate may help explain 
the OJE. The results of this thesis is among the various studies that seem to show that the 
OJE may be an artifact of the time period of data studied or is an artifact of the statistical 
methodology used to determine its existence. 
I show that term premium has all the qualities of the January barometer and the 
regression results show significant spreads when using term premium as a predictor for 
the OJE. 
Regression results also showed that short term yields explain the OJE much like 
the January dummy. However, the January dummy is not subsumed by the 
macroeconomic variables in these regressions. 
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In replicating the original study of Cooper, McConnell and Ovtchinnikov (2006), 
I found the OJE is strangely absent after accounting for macroeconomic variables in most 
of the CRSP indices, I also see that the OJE could be attributed to the negative Januaries 
is some of the regressions. 
Inconclusive results were obtained when tried to account for the other January 
Effect by first conditioning the January returns with macroeconomic variables. 
Essentially using the value weighted excess and value weighted raw returns supported the 
existence of the OJE but not when using equal weighted excess or equal weighted raw 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for the following variables: S&P 500 index 
return, S&P 500 index volatility, forecasting enors, dispersion adjusted forecasting 
errors, and absolute value of residual from AR(l)-model of dispersion adjusted 
forecasting errors for six macroeconomic variables. The macroeconomic variables 
include GDP growth (gdp), unemployment rate (unemp), industrial production (ip), 
housing starts (housing), corporate profits (cp), and GDP price index (pgdp). 8m stands 
for the unadjusted forecasting enors for macro variable m. dm stands for the uncertainty 
adjusted forecasting enors. vm denotes the absolute value of residuals from AR(1)-
model. The sample period is from 1968:Q4 to 2009:Q4. 
Std. Ex. 














































































































































Table 2. S&P 500 Index and Surprises in Macroeconomic News Adjusted for Forecasting 
Uncertainty: Contemporaneous and Lagged relations 
Panel A. This table reports the results for the following OLS regressions: 
Rt = fe + fed9dp + p2dT
emv + P3d? + P4d?
ousin9 + p5d? + p6d
P9dp + e. 
iffdp llP housing ,cp iPgdp R,= fe+ /_<#_"_ + /?2dt-i + fed?-, + M - i + fe
d?-i + fedt-i + * 
where* Rt is the S&P 500 index return in quarter t. d = 
disp 
is the forecasting enor 
variable adjusted for forecasting uncertainty, where 5 denotes the differences between 
actual values of macroeconomic variables and SPF forecasts, and disp is the cross-
sectional forecasting dispersion measure defined as the difference between the 75th 
percentile and the 25th percentile of the SPF projections. The macroeconomic forecast 
enors included are nominal GDP (gdp), unemployment rate (unemp), industrial 
production (ip), housing starts (housing), corporate profits (cp), and GDP price index 
(pgdp). Heteroscedasticity and autoconelation consistent t-statistics, R and adjusted R 
values are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. The sample period is from 1968:Q4 to 2009:Q4 for contemporaneous and 


















































Table 2. (Continued) 
Panel B. This table reports the results for the following OLS regressions: 
iQdp 
Vol, = fe + Pxdr + fed?-
11' + fed? + Ptd? + p5d? + p6d
Pi 
+ Et 
i9dp ,iP housing ,cp iPgdp vol, = fe + pxd™ + &CT + MU + MT-x + fe
d?-i + fedtT + £t 
where, Volt is the S&P 500 index volatility in quarter t. d = —— is the forecasting enor 
variable adjusted for forecasting uncertainty, where 8 denotes the differences between 
actual values of macroeconomic variables and SPF forecasts, and disp is the cross-
sectional forecasting dispersion measure defined as the difference between the 75th 
percentile and the 25th percentile of the SPF projections. The macroeconomic forecast 
enors included are nominal GDP (gdp), unemployment rate (unemp), industrial 
production (ip), housing starts (housing), corporate profits (cp), and GDP price index 
(pgdp). Heteroscedasticity and autoconelation consistent t-statistics, R and adjusted R 
values are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. The sample period is from 1968:Q4 to 2009:Q4 for contemporaneous and 
















































Table 3. 30-day S&P 500 index with Macroeconomic forecasts and lagged dependent 
variable 
This table reports the results for the following OLS regressions: 
Rt,30-day =fe+ feft9'' + feftUnemP + fef? + fefth°USin9 + feft^ + fef?9dP 







usin9+feftZ + fef?9dp 
+ V°k-l,30-day + £t 
where, Rt,3o-day is t n e S&P 500 index return in the middle month of quarter t and 
Volt30-day is the S&P 500 index volatility in the middle month of quarter t. Rt-i,3o-day 
is the S&P 500 index return in the first month of quarter t and Volt-X30„day is the S&P 
500 index volatility in the first month of quarter t. / ' s are the forecasts of the SPF 
forecasters. The macroeconomic forecasts included are nominal GDP (gdp), 
unemployment rate (unemp), industrial production (ip), housing starts (housing), 
corporate profits (cp), and GDP price index (pgdp). Heteroscedasticity and 
autoconelation consistent t-statistics, R and adjusted R values are also reported. *, **, 
and *** denote significance levels at 10%>, 5%, and 1% respectively. The sample period 























































Table 4. S&P 500 Index and Volatilities of Macroeconomic News Adjusted for 
Forecasting Uncertainty and lagged dependent variable 
Panel A. This table reports the results for the following OLS regressions: 
Rt= fe+ fevf
p + fevtnemp + fe4p + fevht
0USin9 + fey? + fev?9dp + feRt-i 
+ £t 
Vol, = fe + Pxv
9dp + p2vr
mP + fev? + fev?™™9 + fev? + P6v
P9dp 
+ P7V0l,.x+ £, 
where, R, is the S&P 500 index return for the quarter t and Vol,_ is the S&P 500 index 
volatility for the quarter t. v is the absolute value of residuals collected from AR(1)-
model of d, d = —— is the forecasting error variable adjusted for forecasting 
uncertainty, where 5 denotes the differences between actual values of macroeconomic 
variables and SPF forecasts, and disp is the cross-sectional forecasting dispersion 
measure defined as the difference between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile of 
the SPF projections. The volatilities macroeconomic forecast errors included are nominal 
GDP (gdp), unemployment rate (unemp), industrial production (ip), housing starts 
(housing), corporate profits (cp), and GDP price index (pgdp). Heteroscedasticity and 
autoconelation consistent t-statistics, R2 and adjusted R2 values are also reported. *, **, 
and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The sample period 























































Table 4. (Continued) 




+ p7R,-x + £t 
Vol, = p0+ pxa
9dp + p2o-?
nemp + p3a? + p^
ousing + psa? + pea
P9dp 
+ P7V0l,_x + £, 
where, R, is the S&P 500 index return for the quarter t and Volt> is the S&P 500 index 
volatility for the quarter t. a is a rolling summation of 4 quarters of the absolute value of 
residuals collected from AR(l)-model of d, d = 
disp 
is the forecasting enor variable 
adjusted for forecasting uncertainty, where 5 denotes the differences between actual 
values of macroeconomic variables and SPF forecasts, and disp is the cross-sectional 
forecasting dispersion measure defined as the difference between the 75th percentile and 
the 25th percentile of the SPF projections. The macroeconomic forecast enors included 
are nominal GDP (gdp), unemployment rate (unemp), industrial production (ip), housing 
starts (housing), corporate profits (cp), and GDP price index (pgdp). Heteroscedasticity 
and autoconelation consistent t-statistics, R and adjusted R values are also reported. *, 
**, and *** denote significance levels at 10%>, 5%, and 1% respectively. The sample 























































Table 5. S&P 500 index and Monetary Shocks with Lagged Dependent variable. 
This table reports the following regressions: 
R,= p0+ pxMonetary, + p2R,-x + s. 
Vol, = P0+ pxMonetary, + p2Vol,_x + £, 
where, R, is the S&P 500 index return for a month. Vol, is the S&P 500 index volatility 
for a month. Monetary, is the change in the actual federal funds rate controlling for 
forecasts, converted to monthly and is a shock variable. Heteroscedasticity and 
9 9 
autoconelation consistent t-statistics, R and adjusted R values are also reported. *, **, 
and *** denote significance levels at 10%>, 5%, and 1% respectively. In Panel A the 
sample period is from 1969:M4 to 2008:M6. In Panel B the sample period is from 
1969:M4 to 1988:M12. In Panel C the sample period is from 1989:M1 to 2008:M6. 
Panel A: 1969:M4 to 2008:M6. 
const 
Monetary 
S&P 500 Lag 
R2 
Adj.R2 






















Panel B: 1969:M4to 1988:M12. 
const 
Monetary 
S&P 500 Lag 
R2 
Adi. R2 























Table 5. (Continued) 
Panel C: 1989:M1 to 2008:M6 
const 
Monetary 
S&P 500 Lag 
R2 
Adi. R2 























Table 6. S&P 500 Index and Surprises in Macroeconomic News Adjusted for Forecasting 
Uncertainty: Contemporaneous and Lagged relations 
Panel A. This table reports the results for the following OLS regressions: 
ipgdp R,= fe + PxdfP + fedTemV + fed? + P,d?usin9 + psd? + p6d
 
+ pxMonetary, + E, 
Rt = fe + fed9dpx + p2d?T
v + p3d?.x + p4d»°f
n9 + p5d?x + p6d
pEdp 
+ pxMonetary,-.x + E, 
where, R, is the S&P 500 index return in quarter t. d = 
disp 
is the forecasting enor 
variable adjusted for forecasting uncertainty, where 8 denotes the differences between 
actual values of macroeconomic variables and SPF forecasts, and disp is the cross-
sectional forecasting dispersion measure defined as the difference between the 75th 
percentile and the 25th percentile of the SPF projections. Monetary, is the change in the 
actual federal funds rate controlling for forecasts, converted to quarterly. The 
macroeconomic forecast enors included are nominal GDP (gdp), unemployment rate 
(unemp), industrial production (ip), housing starts (housing), corporate profits (cp), and 
GDP price index (pgdp). Heteroscedasticity and autoconelation consistent t-statistics, R 
and adjusted R2 values are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The sample period is from 1969:Q2 to 2008:Q2 for 
contemporaneous and 1969:Q3 to 2008:Q3 for lagged. 
const 
Monetary 



















































Table 6. (Continued) 
Panel B. This table reports the results for the following OLS regressions: 
Vol, = p0+ pxd
9dp + p2d™
emp + p3d? + p,d
h,ousin9 + psd? + p6d
p,9dp 
+ pxMonetary, + £, 
iPgdp Vol, = p0 + pxd
9dp + p2d?T
P + p3d?_x + p^T
n9 + fed?x + fedpt
9a 
+ pxMonetary,_x + E, 
where, Vol, is the S&P 500 index volatility in quarter t. d = —— is the forecasting enor 
variable adjusted for forecasting uncertainty, where 8 denotes the differences between 
actual values of macroeconomic variables and SPF forecasts, and disp is the cross-
sectional forecasting dispersion measure defined as the difference between the 75th 
percentile and the 25th percentile of the SPF projections. Monetary, is the change in the 
actual federal funds rate controlling for forecasts, converted to quarterly. The 
macroeconomic forecast enors included are nominal GDP (gdp), unemployment rate 
(unemp), industrial production (ip), housing starts (housing), corporate profits (cp), and 
GDP price index (pgdp). Heteroscedasticity and autoconelation consistent t-statistics, R 
and adjusted R values are also reported. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 
10%, 5%, and 1%> respectively. The sample period is from 1969:Q2 to 2008:Q2 for 
contemporaneous and 1969:Q3 to 2008:Q3 for lagged. 
const 
Monetary 



















































Table 7. The OJE and Term Premium: 1954 to 2009 
This table reports the OJE with term premium (TP) results using monthly CRSP value 
weighted (VWR) and equal-weight (EWR) index returns from 1954 to 2009. TP is 
defined as the difference between yields on 10-year and 1-year Treasures. I include 
results for both raw returns and excess returns. Rf denotes the monthly risk-free rate. I 
estimate the following five models: 
Model 20: r, = oc + pD],an + E, 
Model 21: r, = oc + pDjp + E, 
Model 22: rt = oc + pD
J,an~TP + E, 
Model 23: r, = oc + pDT,P~}an + E, 
Model 24: r, = oc + pDT,PxJan + E, 
where r, is the. 11-month return over February to December in year t, D, is the January 
dummy that equals one if the January return for the CRSP index is positive anc1 is z^rc 
otherwise. Djp is the term premium dummy variable that equals one when term premium 
is positive and zero otherwise. D,~ is a dummy variable that equals one if D, = l 
and Djp = 0, and equals 0 otherwise. D,~ is a dummy variable that equals one if Djp 
= l and D],an = 0, and equals 0 otherwise. j)^Px}an is a dummy variable that equals one if 
D, = l and Djp = l, and equals 0 otherwise. Panel A to E report the results for Models 
l to 5 respectively. For each panel, I report the mean returns for the two cases where the 
dummy variables equal one and zero. The return spreads and their t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are also included. N denotes the number observations for each value of the 
dummy variables. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
Panel A: Model 20 
Mean Return (%),Z)/an = 1 
N 


































Table 7. (Continued) 
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Panel B: Model 21 
VMR-fy VWR EWR-fy EWR 
Mean Return (%),Dt
rp = 1 
N 




























Panel C: Model 22 
VMR-fy VWR EWR-/? £. EWR 
Mean Return {%),D},an TP = 1 
N 




























Panel D: Model 23 
VMR-fy VWR EWR-fy EWR 
Mean Return (%),Z)t
TP }an = 1 
N 




























Panel E: Model 24 
VMR-fy VWR EWR-/? £. EWR 
Mean Return {%),DT,Px}an = 1 
N 





























Table 8. Macroeconomic Variables and OJE 
This table reports the results from variations of the following regression: 
RFEB,DEC = ^ + pjERMti + p2DIV,_x + P3DEF,_X + p4DYLD,_x + P5YLD,_X + 
axD[ + a2R, + E, where RFEB>DEC [S the 11-month return from February to 
December in year t. The regressors are lagged macro variables from December of the 
prior year. They include term premium (TERM), dividend yield (DIV), default premium 
(DEF), three-month T-bill yield (YLD) and its de-trended version (DYLD). RJt
AN is the 
market index return in the January of year t, and D, is the January dummy for the year 
1.1 also estimate the same model but use macro variables in January oft as the regressors. 
The sample period is from 1954 to 2009. R2 denotes the adjusted R value of the 
regressions, and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Panels A to D report the results 
for value weighted excess returns (VWR - Rf), value weighted returns (VWR), equal 
weighted excess returns (EWR - Rf), and equal weighted returns (EWR) respectively. 



















































































Table 8. (Continued) 























































































































































































Panel D: EWR 
































































Table 9. Macroeconomic Variables and subsequent 11-month return from February to December 
This table reports the results based on the following regression where the dependent variable is the 11-month return from February to 
December. The regressors are lagged (from December of the prior year) macro variables term premium (TERM), dividend yield 
(DIV), default premium (DEF), and the de-trended three-month T-bill (DYLD). The sample period is from 1954 to 2009. E[R] 
denotes the excess 11-month returns from the regression. I report the mean returns (in percentage) from four scenarios where E[R] > 
median E[R] or E[R] < median E[R] and the returns in January is positive or negative. I include the results based on the abnormal 
returns (residuals) and the full holding period returns based on CRSP value-weight excess returns (VWR - Rf), value weighted raw 
return (VWR), equal weighted excess returns (EWR - Rf), and equal weighted raw returns (EWR). The return spreads and the 
associated p-values (in parentheses) are also included. Panel A reports the results for the predicted model where the de-trended three-




Table 9. (Continued) 
VWR - Rf 
E[R] > median E[R] 
E[R] < median E[R] 
VWR 
E[R] > median E[R] 
E[R] < median E[R] 
EWR - Rf 
E[R] > median E[R] 
E[R] < median E[R] 
EWR 
E[R] > median E[R] 
E[R] < median E[R] 
Panel A: R FEB.DEC t ~ 



















P0 + pxTERM,_x + p 



















2DIV,_X + B3DEF,_X + p4DYLD,. - i + ft 





































Table 9. (Continued) 
Panel B: RFEB'DEC = p0+ pxTERM,.x + P2DIV,_X + P3DEF,_X + P4YLD,_X + £, 
11- month holding period abnormal return 11- month holding period raw returns 
Pos Jan Neg Jan Spread p-value Pos Jan Neg Jan Spread p-value 
VWR - Rr 
E[R] > median E[R] 
E[R] < median E[R] 
VWR 
E[R] > median E[R] 
E[R] < median E[R] 
EWR - Rf 
E[R] > median E[R] 
E[R] < median E[R] 
EWR 
E[R] > median E[R] 


































Table 10. The OJE after Controlling for Macroeconomic Effects 
This table reports the OJE after controlling for Macroeconomic Variables using monthly 
CRSP value weighted (VWR) and equal weighted (EWR) index returns. I include results 
for both raw and excess returns Rf denotes the monthly risk-free rate. I estimate the 
following regression models: 
Model 28: RJ,AN = fe + PiTERM,_x + p2D!V,_x + p3DEF,_x + p4YLD,_x + s. 
Model 29: RJ,AN = fe + PiTERM, + p2DIV, + P3DEF, + PJLD, + £, 
Model 30: RJ,AN = fe + PiTERM, + p3DEF, + pAYLD,_x + £, 
Where R, is the stock index return in January of year t. The regressors in Model 1 are 
lagged macroeconomic variables, term variable (TERM,), dividend yield (DIV,-X), 
default premium (DEF,_X), and the three-month T-bill yield (YLD,_X) from December of 
year t - 1. In Model 2 the regressors are contemporaneous macroeconomic variables, 
term variable (TERM,), dividend yield (DIV,), default premium (DEF,), and the three-
month T-bill yield (YLD,) from January of year. In Model 3, I use the same 
contemporaneous regressors of Model 2 having removed dividend yield (DIV,). I report 
the post-January 11-month returns following positive (E, > 0) and negative (E, < 0) 
Januarys. The return spreads and their P-values (in parenthesis) are also included. N 
denotes the number of observations. I include results from the sample of 1954 to 2009. 
Panel A: Model 28 
VWR-/?f VMR EWR-Rr EWR 
Mean Returns (Positive January)% 
N 


















Spread % 10.29 10.85 4.57 5.16 
p-value (0.0201) (0.0139) (0.4676) (0.4145) 
66 
Table 10. (Continued) 
Panel B: Model 29 
Mean Returns (Positive January)% 
N 
































Panel C: Model 30 
Mean Returns (Positive January)% 
N 
































Table 11. The OJE after Controlling for Macroeconomic Effects, Robustness Check 
This table reports the OJE after controlling for Macroeconomic Variables using monthly CRSP value weighted (VWR) and equal 
weighted (EWR) index returns. I include results for both raw and excess returns Rf denotes the monthly risk-free rate. I estimate the 
following regression model: 
Model 31: RJ,AN = fe + PJERM,^ + P2DEF,_X + P3YLD,„X + pJERM, + p5DEF, + p6YLD, + £, 
Where R, is the stock index return in January of year t. The regressors in Model are lagged and contemporaneous macroeconomic 
variables, term variable (TERM,-X), default premium (DEF,_X), three-month T-bill yield (YLD,_X), term variable (TERM,), default 
premium (DEF,), and the three-month T-bill yield (YLD,) t-1 terms are from December of the previous year and t terms are January of 
the present year. I also estimate an alternative model where the dependent variable is the January dummy D{ . I report the post-
January 11-month returns following positive (£t > 0) and negative (E, < 0) Januarys. The return spreads and their P-values (in 
parenthesis) are also included. N denotes the number of observations. I include results from the sample of 1954 to 2009 as well as 3 
sub-sample periods. Panels A, B, C, and D report the results for the value weighted index excess returns, value weighted raw returns, 
equal weighted excess returns, and equal weighted raw returns respectively. 
Panel A: VWR - Rf 
RT 
54 to 09 54 to 73 74 to 93 94 to 09 54 to 09 54 to 73 74 to 93 94 to 09 
Mean Return (Pos Jan) % 
N 











































p-value (0.0230) (0.8119) (0.2593) (0.5770) (0.0081) (0.2749) (0.0473) (0.2626) 
Table 11. (Continued) 
Panel B: VWR 
Mean Return (Pos Jan) % 
N 






























































Panel C: EWR - Rf 
Mean Return (Pos Jan) % 
N 
































































Table 11. (Continued) 
Panel D: EWR 
Rjr 
54 to 09 54 to 73 74 to 93 94 to 09 54 to 09 54 to 73 74 to 93 94 to 09 
Mean Return (Pos Jan) % 
N 











































p-value (0.4498) (0.1202) (0.8027) (0.4853) (0.3761) (0.0019) (0.5179) (0.9903) 
70 
Figure 1. Forecasting Enors of Macroeconomic Variables 
This figure plots the time series for SPF forecasting enors of for following 
macroeconomic variables: GDP, Unemployment Rate, Industrial Production, Housing 
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Figure 2. Forecasting Uncertainty of Macroeconomic Variables 
This figure plots the time series for SPF forecasting uncertainty of for following 
macroeconomic variables: GDP, Unemployment Rate, Industrial Production, Housing 







































Figure 3. Uncertainty Adjusted Forecasting Enors of Macroeconomic Variables 
This figure plots the time series for SPF forecasting enors adjusted for forecasting 
uncertainty for following macroeconomic variables: GDP, Unemployment Rate, 
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Figure 4. Monetary Shock Variable 
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